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IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * *

DYNAPAC, INC., a Utah corporation
and TRACY COLLINS BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,
a Utah corporation
Plaintiffs-Respondents
v.
INNOVATIONS, INC., a Utah corporation,
JOHtf CUNNINGHAM, and ROBERT E. OVERTREE,

CASE No. 14243

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
* * * * * *

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS-RESPONDENTS
DYNAPAC, INC., AND TRACY COLLINS BANK & TRUST COMPANY
* * * * * *

NATURE OF CASE
This is an action brought upon a contract for money due
and owing, for damages for breach of contract, fraud, and/or
unjust enrichment.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Respondents obtained a default judgment against Robert
E. Overtree, Appellant herein.

Appellant, more than three

months thereafter, filed an Answer and a Motion for an Order
setting Aside the Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the Judgment

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was entered erroneously and because of mistake, inadvertance,
surprise and excusable neglect. The Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
Sr., presiding in the lower court, first granted the Motion
and then upon a rehearing nullified that Minute Entry and
reinstated the Judgment, granting Appellant leave to file an
amended Motion to set aside the Judgment.

Appellant then

refiled his motion moving that the Judgment be set aside
pursuant to "all of the provisions of Rule 60(b), Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure."

Appellant thereafter filed an additional

Motion to Quash Service of Process against him on the grounds
that no endorsement of the personfs name, title, and the
date served was made upon the Summons served upon the Defendant
as required by Rule 4(j), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Judge Stewart M. Hanson, Sr. thereafter entered a Memorandum
Decision finding that Appellant's Motion to Set Aside the
Default should be denied and that the Judgment should stand.
The Court thence denied the Motion to Set Aside the Judgment
and the Motion to Quash.

From this Order Appellant appeals.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents pray that the Order of the Lower court
denying Appellant's motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment
and his Motion to Quash Service of Process be affirmed.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
As Appellant's Statement of Facts contains some errors
and important omissions, Respondents deem it imperative to
make a Statement of Facts rather than to adopt Appellant's
Statement of Facts by reference.
Plaintiff's complaint (the pages of the Complaint have
become shuffled in the record and are at R.106-114, 117,
116, 115, 118, 119, 96-98, 99, 94 and 93) set forth eight
Claims for Relief which are briefly summarized as follows:
FIRST:

That Defendants entered into an Agreement and

Modification Agreement with Stokermatic (the predecessor to
Dynapac, Inc.) to the effect that Innovations would pay to
Stokermatic $40,000.00 for the purchase of certain personal
property, but that Innovations defaulted on the contract with
the sum of $38,890.81 owing and being due with interest
thereon.
SECOND:

That the Defendants have refused and are

unable to transfer ninety-four percent (94%) of the stock of
Innovations to Stokermatic as they were obligated to do in
the event of default and that by reason thereof "Cunningham
and Overtree are liable to Stokermatic for payment of the
amount owing pursuant to the Agreement."
Referring to the Statement of Facts set forth in Appellant's
brief, Appellant alleges that there is no obligation set
forth in Exhibit "B" (the Modification Agreement) which

-3-
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describes any obligation by Appellant as the party thereto.
Page 2 of said Modification Agreement (R.96) specifically
provides that Cunningham, Appellant, and Innovations would
transfer 94% of the outstanding stock of Innovations to
Stokermatic upon default in payments or insolvency of Innovations.
THIRD:

This claim dealt only with Defendant Cunningham

is not related to this appeal.
FOURTH:

That Cunningham and Appellant as principal

officers and directors of Innovations conducted the affairs
of the Corporation as their alter-ego and as though it were
their own business and that they have used the Corporation
"for the purpose of defrauding Stokermatic as hereinabove
set forth and are therefore personally liable to Stokermatic
for the Corporate debts of Innovations."
FIFTH:

That Appellant and Cunningham personally guaranteed

the payment of Innovation's obligation to Stokermatic and
that they had refused to pay the same.
SIXTH:

That the Defendant Cunningham and Appellant

wrongfully or mistakenly obtained from American National
Bank the stock certificates placed in escrow which resulted
in unjust enrichment to them and that they were liable to
Respondent Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. (successor by
merger to the escrow accounts of American National Bank) for
the return of the stock certificates or the cash equivalent
thereof as of the date of the release of the stock in the
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event the stock was then worth less than it was worth when
the stock was released.
SEVENTH:

That by reason of the release of the stock,

Appellant and Cunningham were unjustly enriched and that
Plaintiffs should be compensated and that the reasonable
value of the benefit to the Defendants was then unknown but
would become known during the course of this action.
EIGHTH:

That Cunningham and Appellant, as the principal

officers and directors of the company, disposed of the
assets of Innovations for less than their fair market value
in fraud of creditors and that by reason thereof the Defendants
looted or gutted Innovations of its corporate assets making
it impossible for Innovations to carry on its business in
such a way as to enable it to generate income sufficient to
pay the obligations owing to Stokermatic and that Stokermatic
made demand upon Cunningham and Appellant for payment of the
corporate debt but that they had refused to pay the same.
The Prayer of said complaint asked for judgment against
the Defendants, and each of them, jointly and severally, in
the sum of $38,890.81 plus interest thereon, and for judgment
in favor of Tracy Collins Bank and Trust Co. for the return
of 107,052 shares of Innovations stock or, in the alternative,
the value of said stock as of October 23, 1969 in the event
the stock was then worth less than its value on said date.
All of the foregoing were abstracted from the Complaint.
(R.106-113).
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The following is a chronology of events as they relate
to Appellant:
December 7, 1973;

Complaint filed.

January 24, 1974:

Appellant served.

March 25, 1974:

Default Certificate filed (R.85)

May 19, 1974:

Default Judgment entered. (R.84)

May 20, 1974:

Notice of Judgment sent to> i
Appellant (R.80, 82, 83).

August 19, 1974

Appellant filed an Answer (R.64-66)
and a Motion to Set Aside the
Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1)
(R.67).

September 9, 1974

Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment
was heard and granted by Minute
Entry (R.53).

December 18, 1974:

Motion to Set Aside reheard on
Stipulation, Minute Entry nullified,
Default Judgment reinstated,
Appellant given five (5) days to
file an Amended Motion to Set Aside,
said Amended Motion to be deemed to
have been filed on August 19, 1974.
(R.42, 43).

December 26, 1974:

Amended Motion "pursuant to all of
the provisions of Rule 60 (b)" was
filed (R.37, 38).

April 2, 1975:

Motion to Quash Service of Process
filed (R.32).

April 30, 1975:

Motion to Set Aside Judgment
and Quash Service of Process were
heard.

May 1, 1975:

Memorandum Decision was filed
stating that both motions should be
denied.

(R.105)
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August 1, 1975:

Order entered denying Appellants
Motions to Set Aside and to Quash.
(R.22).

August 8, 1975;

Motion to Amend Order of August 1,
l975^

August 14, 1975;

filed

(R#13#

14J#

Motion to Amend denied by
Minute Entry (R.ll).

It should be noted that Appellant's Answer and Motion
to Set Aside under Rule 60(b)(1) were filed more than three
(3) months after the Default Judgment was entered.

The

motion was made on the basis that the judgment was entered
erroneously and because of mistake, inadvertance, surprise
and excuseable neglect. Neither the Answer nor the Motion
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person due
to faulty service of process.
The Judgment by Default recited that "judgment is
hereby entered against said Defendant, Robert E. Overtree,
pursuant to the Prayer of Complaint on file herein."

Said

Default Judgement recited further that "by virtue of the law
and by reason of the premises aforesaid, it is ordered,
adjudged, and decreed that said Plaintiffs do recover from
said Defendant the sum of Forty-Three Thousand Four Hundred
and Fifty-Four Dollars and Sixty-Seven cents ($43,454.67)
plus interest thereon at the rate of eight percent (8%) per
annum until paid, and for costs of suit."

(R.75).

An Affidavit (R.61, 62} was filed with Appellant's
Motion to Set Aside the Judgment which alleged essentially
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that the Appellant was served on or about the 24th day of
January, 1974, and had referred the matter to an attorney in
Utah, Delwin Pond, with instructions for Mr. Pond to file an
Answer on Affiant's behalf.

Said Affidavit alleged that

about thirty (30) days thereafter Appellant called Mr. Pond
to inquire as to the status of the matter and Mr. Pond
informed him that he no longer wished to represent him and
that an Answer had not been filed.

The Affidavit further

alleged that Appellant contacted Gordon Roberts, one of the
attorneys for Plaintiffs, and requested an extension of time
to file the Answer and that Mr. Roberts stated to Appellant
that before any default would be entered he would give
Appellant notice of his intention to take a default.

No

affidavit by Mr. Pond was filed to verify the allegations of
Appellant in his affidavit.
The Affidavit of Respondents1 attorney, Gordon L.
Roberts, in opposition to the Affidavit of Appellant was
filed with the Court on September 6, 1974, (R.54-56), wherein
Mr. Roberts stated that following the entry of the Default
on March 25, 1974, but before entry of the Default Judgment,
he had a telephone conversation with a person purporting to
be Appellant wherein said person was advised by Mr. Robesrts
that a Default had in fact been entered, but a Default
Judgment had not been entered.

Appellant was advised that

before entry of a Default Judgment there would be further

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

communications.

Subsequent thereto, Mr. Roberts, as stated

in his Affidavit, was contacted by Sumner Hatch, an attorney
in Salt Lake City, and was advised by Mr. Hatch that he had
been retained to represent Appellant.

Mr. Hatch asked if

Mr. Roberts would be willing to stipulate to setting aside
the default and Mr. Roberts stated that he could not stipulate
to setting aside the default and that Mr. Hatch, if he
desired, could file a motion to seek that relief.

After two

weeks elapsed and no action was taken, Mr. Roberts called
Mr. Hatch to ask whether the action was to be taken. Mr.
Hatch advised Mr. Roberts that he had not received a retainer
and that as far as he was concerned he was not representing
Appellant any further.

Roberts advised Mr. Hatch that he

intended to enter a Default Judgment inasmuch as substantial
time had elapsed since the entry of the default and he owed
an obligation to his client to proceed with the matter.
Default Judgment was thereafter entered.

Mr. Roberts in his

Affidavit stated that at no time did he advise Appellant or
any person purporting to be him that he could have an extension
of time or that a Default would not be entered and that, in
fact, at no time prior to the entry of the Default did Mr.
Roberts have any conversations whatsoever with Appellant.
On December 17, 1974, Respondents filed the Affidavit
of Sumner J. Hatch (R.40, 41) which set forth essentially
that Mr. Hatch had been contacted by Appellant and that they

-9-
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discussed this matter at which time Appellant indicated that
a default had been entered against him.

The affidavit of

Mr. Hatch stated that the first contact was on April 2, 1974
and that after reviewing the pleadings Mr. Hatch called Mr.
Overtree on aproximately April 6th or 7th, 1974 and indicated
that he thought he could get the default set aside and
requested a retainer of $650.00.

The Affidavit of Mr. Hatch

states that he did not hear back from Appellant after that.
Appellant's Amended Motion to Set Aside was filed on
December 26, 1974, and listed as grounds that Overtree had
an understanding with Plaintiffs1 counsel that further
communications from said Counsel would be had before a
Default was to be entered, and no such communication was
made, that no written agreement to guarantee any obligation
of the Defendant, Innovations, Inc., was ever introduced
into evidence, and that no testimony was adduced at the time
the Default Judgment was taken to prove any unliquidated sum
complained by Plaintiff as to the Defendant, that service of
process should be quashed because of failure to comply with
Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the
Appellant had a good and valid defense to the claims of the
Plaintiffs.
Judge Stewart M. Hanson's Memorandum Decision (R.28)
stated that Appellant's motion was made for the purpose of
delay and that he had not been misled in any manner.
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POINT I
BY FILING AN ANSWER AND A MOTION TO
SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
RULE 60(b)(1), APPELLANT SUBMITTED
HIMSELF TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURT AND WAIVED ANY DEFENSE HE HAD
FOR NONCOMPLIANCE WITH RULE 4(j)
OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Rule 4(j) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states
that:
"At the time of Service, the person making
such service shall endorse upon the copy of
the summons left for the person being served,
the date upon which the same was served, and
shall sign his name thereto, and, if an
officer, add his official title."
Failure to comply with Rule 4(j) is fatally defective
when the defendant appears specially and raises the point of
defective service.

Martin v. Nelson, Jr.

U.2d

, 533

P.2d 897 (1975), Rees v. Scott, 8 U.2d 134, 329 P.2d 877(1958),
Thomas v. District Court, 110 U 245, 171 P.2d 667 (1946).
These cases are in line with Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, which requires that every defense be asserted in
a responsive pleading if one is required except for certain
defenses, including lack of jurisdiction over the person,
which may be made by motion.

The Rule requires, however,

that a motion making this defense must be made before pleading
if a further pleading is permitted.

Rule 12(h) specifically

provides that a party waives all of its defenses which it
does not present either by motion or, if he has made no
motion, in his answer or reply.

As stated, the first pleadings

-11-
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filed by Appellant were an Answer and a Motion to Set Aside
the Default Judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b) (1) on the grounds
that the judgment was entered erroneously and because of
mistake, inadvertance, surprise and excuseable neglect.
Neither the Answer nor the Motion raised the issue of lack
of jurisdiction over the Appellant.

By filing the Answer

and the Motion, Appellant made a general appearance and
waived the defense that the court lacked jurisdiction over
him.

State Tax Comm. v. Larsen, 100 U. 103, 110 P.2d 558

(1941).

In fact, by filing an Answer Appellant submitted

himself to the Court's jurisdiction.
U.2d

Barber v. Calder,

, 522 P.2d 700 (1974).

The court in Thomas v. District Court, supra, made it
abundantly clear that where the requirement of Section 1045-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, (now Rule 4(j)) is not
complied with, the service is fatally defective only when
timely attacked by motion.

The court stated at 110 Utah 251

that:
"We have a statute, Sec. 104-5-10, supra, which
in harmony with these cases, recognize and imply
that when a defective service of summons is timely
attacked it should be quashed. It provides inter
alia that objections to the service be taken by
motion before pleading to the complaint. I T . As
early as 1880 this court held that under the statute
defects of service must be timely raised by motion
or it would be deemed waived. [Citation omitted].
In State Tax Coram, v. Larsen, 100 Utah 103, 110 P.2d
558, we held that defective service could be attacked
after default but not after pleading." (Emphasis
added).
Significantly, Justice Wolfe in his separate concurring
opinion in Thomas v. District Court, supra, discussed the
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question of whether the failure to make the necessary endorsement
on the copy of the summons left with the defendant made the
service void or merely voidable so that the Court acquired
jurisdiction of the defendant but that the jurisdiction was
vulnerable if timely attacked by motion.

He concluded a

judgment founded on such service was voidable only and that
defendant by timely and proper attack may have the service
set aside. He stated at 110 Utah 259 that:
"Before judgment (absent a general appearance) the
proper attack was motion to quash the service. Had
the default been entered — appeal or motion to set
aside the judgment as provided by Section 104-14-4,
U.C.A. 1943, or suit in equity to set
aside the judgment would have been possible
attacks. However, the service though defective,
gave the Court jurisdiction of the defendant and had
a judgment been entered pursuant thereto, it could
not have been successfully attached collaterally on
grounds of no jurisdiction of the defendant."
There is no dispute that the requirements of Rule 4(j)
were not met.

However, due to the general appearance made

by Appellant, there was a waiver of that defense and it
necessarily follows that the court below did not err in
denying the motion to quash service of process and the
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment filed by Appellant.

POINT II
THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN ITS DENIAL OF THE
MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT OF THE
DEFENDANT BECAUSE APPELLANT'S MOTION UNDER
RULE 60(b) (1) WAS NOT TIMELY MADE AND BECAUSE GROUNDS
FOR SETTING ASIDE UNDER RULE 60(b)(7) DID NOT EXIST.

-13-
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The record clearly shows that on May 17, 1974, Judgment
was entered against Appellant,.

On May 20, 1974, Appellant

was sent a Notice of Judgment, Not until August 19, 1974,
more than three months after judgment was entered, did
Appellant file his answer and motion to set aside the
judgment under Rule 60(b)(1).

Rule 60(b) clearly states

that a motion filed under subdivision (1) must be filed
within three months after the entry of the judgment.

Apparently

because of missing the filing deadline, Appellant was allowed
to file an Amended Motion with such filing to be deemed to
have been as of the date of the original motion.

Appellant

thence filed an Amended Motion to Set Aside the Default
pursuant to "all of the provisions of Rule 60(b)" listing as
grounds for setting aside the judgment the following:
1.

That Appellant conversed with Respondent's
attorney and had an understanding that no
judgment would be taken against him without
notice first being given.

2.

That there was no written agreement ever
introduced into evidence to support any
liability of Appellant as a guarantor of the
obligations of Innovations.

3.

That no testimony was introduced to prove the
unliquidated sum sued for.

4.

Service of process should be quashed because
Rule 4 was not complied with.

5.

Appellant had a good and valid defense.

As to the motion generally, the lower court found and
recited in its Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to Set
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Aside that Appellantfs actions in proceeding to have the
judgment set aside were "...actions or tactics for the
purpose of stalling, and the Court further feels that he was
not misled in any manner or fashion..."

This finding must

be presumed to be valid and correct and the burden of showing
that the finding is in error or that it is so seriously
inequitable that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion by
the court is upon the Appellant.

Warren v, Dixon Ranch Co.,

123 U. 416, 260 P.2d 741 (1953).
The only provisions of Rule 60 (b) that could possibly
be available to Appellant are subdivision (1), which allows
relief in the event of mistake, inadvertance, surprise or
excuseable neglect and subdivision (7) which allows relief
for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment."

As shown, Appellant was not entitled to

relief under subdivision (1) because he failed to file his
motion within the three month period allowed.

In any case,

notwithstanding what may or may not have been represented to
Appellant by Respondents' attorney Gordon Roberts, this
court has held that an alleged promise by plaintiff's attorney
to defendant's attorney that he may have additional time to
answer the complaint, which promise was made after the
default judgment had been entered, is not binding because
"such a promise, if given, could in no way bind a client who
already had a judgment."

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., 123 U.

at p.420. Respondents submit that the law is the same in the
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situations where the default of the Defendant has been
entered but the judgment has not been entered, both the
default and default judgment being governed by Rule 55.
This Court in Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, stated
that the Court on Appeal would reverse the trial courtfs
order denying a motion to set aside the judgment only where
an abuse of discretion is clearly shown.

It discussed the

conflicting considerations of finality of decisions for
purposes of res judicata, keeping the prevailing party from
having to prosecute his case more than once, and enabling
him to enforce his judgment as soon as possible versus
allowing the losing party to present his defense.

The court

then stated at 123 U. p.420:
"However, the movant must show that he used due
diligence and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances over which he had no control."
Relating this to the case at bar, Appellants own affidavit
shows that he was served about January 24, 1974, and referred
the summons to Attorney Delwin Pond to answer and that about
thirty (30) days thereafter (about February 24, 1974) he
contacted Mr. Pond and was informed by Mr. Pond that he no
longer wished to represent Appellant.

Appellant at that

time, according to his affidavit (or some thirty (30) days
thereafter (about March 24, 1974) according to Mr. Robert's
affidavit), conversed with Mr. Roberts about Appellant
answering the complaint.

According to Mr. Roberts, Appellant

-16-
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was then informed that his default had been entered but that
the judgment had not. According to the affidavit of Sumner
J. Hatch, he was contacted by Appellant approximately April
2, 1974, and was asked to represent him.

On April 6 or 7,

1974, Mr. Hatch requested a retainer and agreed to represent
Appellant.

Appellant never contacted Mr. Hatch further

because apparently he thought the fee was too high.

Forty

days thereafter, on May 17, 1974, a default judgment was
entered.

Not until August 19, 1974 (almost seven months

after Appellant was served), was an answer and a motion to
set aside the judgment filed.

Certainly, the foregoing shows an

awareness by Appellant that he was in a very difficult legal
position.

Notwithstanding, Appellant failed for seven

months after service of the Summons to take the action that
due diligence required of him.

There is no evidence that

Appellant could not afford to pay a lawyer to file the
answer.

There were no circumstances over which he did not

have control that prevented him from taking timely and
appropriate action.

In addition, this issue is related to

matters properly within the provisions of subdivision (1) of
Rule 60(b) relating to mistake, inadvertance, surprise and
excuseable neglect, Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co., supra, and
not within subdivision (7), and a motion based on this issue
was not timely made.

Federal courts in dealing with federal

Rule 60(b)(6), which is the same as Rule 60(b)(7), U.R.C.P.,
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have held that a party cannot bring a matter under subdivision
(7) if it is within the purview of the other subdivisions of
the rule.

Klapprott v. United States, 338 US 601, 336 US

942, 695 at 384, 93 L Ed. 266 (1949).

Otherwise, the maximum

time limitation of three months for matters justifying
relief under subdivision (1) would be meaningless.

7 Moore's

Federal Practice, 2d. Ed., P.343.
Appellant states in his brief (page 14-16) that:
"While these esses represent facts when a motion
was filed within the three-month period of Rule
60, this court has always recognized the need for
setting aside a default for good cause in case
where the motion was not filed within three (3)
months such as in the case of Ney v. Harrison, 5
U.2d 217, 922 P.2d 1115 (1945), where the motion
to set aside the judgement by the wife a defendant
who had answered and was contesting the case on
its merits was granted even though eleven (11)
months had lapsed from the default judgment to
the motion to set aside and the reason that the
wife had not answered is that she felt that a
divorce decree between her husband and herself
would protect her. In the instant case, the
Affidavit of the Defendant, a resident of
California, which was filed with the motion to
set aside was dated the 6th day of August, 1974,
within the three-month period, and the motion
itself was filed only two (2) days after the
running of the ninety-day period."
By making such an argument, Appellant seems to claim
that the equities involved in this case are substantially
the same as the equitable considerations in Ney v. Harrison,
supra, which led that court to set aside the judgment, and
that the three-month period of Rule 60(b) may be extended by
the court if the moving party happens to be a few days late
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in filing his motion.
true.

Obviously, neither proposition is

In Ney, the defendant had reasonable grounds to

believe that she was protected by the decree of divorce. In
this case, Appellant had notice of the entry of the default
and of the entry of the judgment, and knew or should have
known that none of the other defendants were protecting him
in the litigation.

In fact, Appellant had contacted two

attorneys about representing him.

Appellant failed to take

any action until seven months had elapsed from the time he
was served.

Appellant's entire conduct showed a contemptuous

disregard of the judicial process and such disregard is
grounds for denial of a motion to set aside the judgment.
Weinberger v. Manning, 50 Cal. App. 2d 494, 123 P.2d 531
(1942).

It was not an abuse of discretion on the part of

the trial court to deny said motion.

Warren v. Dixon Ranch Co.,

supra.
The fact that, as pointed out in Appellant's brief,
little progress had been made against the other personal codefendant, Cunningham, is not persuasive because Respondents
did not feel that it was necessary to push the action against
him since they already had a judgment against Appellant
which Respondents felt could be fully satisfied upon execution.
Respondents were under no obligation to continue to prosecute
the action against Cunningham once they had a judgment
against Appellant.

Also, the fact that Cunningham had been

-19-
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diligent in filing an answer should in no way inure to the
benefit of the negligent Appellant,
Appellant also alleges certain defects in the pleadings,
contending that certain alleged omissions and other alleged
deficiencies makes the Complaint such that it fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted.

At pages 17

through 19 of Appellant's brief, Appellant contends that the
Modification Agreement, escrow agreement, and Exhibits "C"
and "D" were not attached to Plaintiff's Complaint and that
allegations based upon these documents are defective.

An

examination of the record indicates that the staple holding
the Complaint and Exhibits together was removed and the
pages shuffled with other documents in the record.

The

pages of the Agreement, put in their proper order, are at
pages 114, 117, 116, 115 and 118 of the record.

The pages

of the Modification Agreement, put in proper order, are at
pages 119, 96, 97 and 98. The escrow agreement (Exhibit
"C") is page 99 of the record.

The pages of Exhibit "D",

put in proper order, are pages 94 and 93 of the record.
Thus, although the record has been shuffled, all of the
Exhibits referred to in the Complaint were filed with the
Complaint.

Any claimed failure to state a claim or other

defect based upon failure to attach to the Complaint Exhibits
referred to therein are clearly unfounded.
The Second Claim for relief, claiming that pursuant to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-20-

the Agreements, Appellant, Cunningham, and Innovations were
obligated to transfer 94% of the stock of Innovations to
Stokermatic but that they then refused and were in fact
unable so to do, is clearly sufficient to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted.
The Fourth Claim for relief, setting forth matters
intended to allow Plaintiffs to "pierce the corporate veil,"
was likewise sufficient to state a claim.
The Fifth Claim for relief alleges a personal guarantee
by Appellant and Cunningham of Innovations obligation and
need not set forth or allege facts concerning a written
agreement as such guarantee was a matter of proof at time of
trial, if necessary.
The Sixth Claim for relief is not inconsistent with the
First Claim as Appellant alleges because no allegation is
made in the First Claim as to Appellant other than that
Appellant had the obligation, in the event of default, to
transfer 94% of the stock outstanding of Innovations to
Stokermatic.

The Second Claim states that certain stock was

in fact put in escrow but that it had been wrongfully or
mistakenly released to Appellant and Cunningham and that
they were unjustly enriched at the expense of Tracy Collins
Bank and Trust Co. by the value of the stock at the time and
that Tracy Collins Bank and Trust as escrow agent was
entitled to its return or the value thereof at the time it
was released.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

Rule 8(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows
demands for relief in the alternative or for several different
types of relief.

Rule 8(e)(2) allows a party to set forth

two or more statements of a claim alternatively, either in
one count or in separate counts.

It further provides that:

"When two or more statements are made in the alternative
and one of them if made independently would be
sufficient, the pleading is not made insufficient
by the insufficiency of one or more of the
alternative statements. A party may state as many
separate claims as he has regardless of consistency
and whether based on legal or equitable grounds
or both."
Rule 8(a) requires only that a pleading setting forth a
claim for relief contain a short and plain statement of the
claim showing the pleader entitled to relief and a demand
for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled
and Rule 8(e)(1) requires each averment to be simple, concise
and direct and eliminates technical forms of pleading.
Respondent submits that all of its claims for relief against
Appellant were adequate under Rule 8.
The fact that Defendant's proposed Answer sets forth
various defenses is immaterial because under Rule 12(h)
Appellant waived any defenses he could have presented by
motion or by Answer timely filed.

Certainly, an answer

filed after the default has been entered is without any
force or effect.

Batchelor v. Finn, 109 C.A. 2d 410, 341

P.2d 803 (1959).

•

\i

• .

.
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POINT III
IT WAS NOT NECESSARY TO PRESENT ANY EVIDENCE
AT THE DEFAULT HEARING TO SHOW THE LIABILITY
OF APPELLANT.
The complaint states that a specific sum of money was
then due and owing by Innovations to Respondent Dynapac, and
that Appellant guaranteed payment of the same, that Appellant
and Cunningham failed and were unable to deliver to Stokermatic
(now Dynapac) 94% of the outstanding stock of Innovations
and were therefore liable for the unpaid balance on the
contract, that Appellant and Cunningham had used the corporation
as their alter ego

as though it were their own business,

and for the purpose of defrauding Stokermatic and that they
were therefore personally liable for the corporate debts of
Innovations, that they were indebted to Respondent Tracy
Collins Bank and Trust Co* for the value of the stock mistakenly
released, that they had been unjustly enriched by the value
of the stock mistakenly released, and that they had looted
or gutted the corporation of its corporate assets thereby
making it impossible for Innovations to pay its debts. The
prayer asked for judgment against Appellant, jointly and
severally with the other defendants, of a specific sum plus
interest and for return of the stock released from escrow
or, in the alternative, the value of said stock on the day
it was released.
Rule 55(b) (2) provides that except where the clerk has
the authority to enter the judgment on a sum certain and
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after personal service on defendant, a plaintiff entitled to
a default judgment shall apply to the court therefore and
that if,
"...in order to enable the court to enter judgment
or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to
take an account or to determine the amount of
damages or to establish the truth of any averment
by evidence or to make an investigation of any
other matter, the court may conduct such hearings
or order such references as it deesms necessary
and proper.1' (Emphasis added).
Respondents submit that no testimony was necessary
because the complaint alleged and prayed for a specific
dollar amount, i.e. a "liquidated sum."

A liquidated sum is

a sum which is determined or fixed or which can be determined
with exactness by arithmetical process.
Utah 46, 276 P. 908 (1929).

Hurd v. Ford, 74

While Respondents may not have

been entitled to a judgment based upon the unstated value of
the stock released from escrow, they were entitled to judgment
based upon breach of contract and their other claims relating
to the specific sum set forth in the complaint.

In essence,

the amount owing under the contract was as susceptible to
proof as the balance owing on a promissory note.
owing on a note is a liquidated sum.

The amount

Alexander v. McDow 108

Cal. 25, 41 P.24, cited in Hurd v. Ford, supra.

Appellant,

by default, admitted the material allegations of the complaint
and plaintiff is not required to establish his cause of action
by proof.

49 C.J.S., Judgments, §213. Cases in which the

courts have not allowed a judgment on an unliquidated
amount primarily involve the award of attorney's fees when
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the amount prayed for is not stipulated by contract and
there is no proof to sustain the same.

Hurd v. Ford,

supra, Even Qdds, Inc. v. Nielson, 22 U.2d 49, 448 P.2d 709
(1968), Butler v. Butler, 23 U.2d 259, 461 P.2d 727 (1969),
Freed Finance Company v. Stoker Motor Company,

U.2d

,

537 P.2d 1039 (1975).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it is respectfully urged that the trial
court did not err in refusing to set aside the Default
Judgment where the court had jurisdiction over Appellant due
to his general appearance and his failure to timely move to
set aside the judgment; that there was no misconduct on the
part of Respondent's attorneys since the default had been
entered prior to any contact with Appellant; that Appellant
waived any defenses he may have had by failing to file a
timely answer or motion to set aside the judgment; that the
judgment was rendered for a sum certain prayed for in the
complaint and no evidence was required.

Accordingly, this

Court should affirm the order of the trial court denying
Appellant's motions to set aside the judgment and to quash
service of process.
DATED thiScT^^Jday of January, 1976.
Respectfully submitted,
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
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